Why did new “Great Powers” rise to prominence within the European states system during the long 18th century?

Together, the Austrian War of Succession and the Seven Years War fundamentally changed the balance of power within the European states system during the latter half of the long 18th century. Prussia managed to challenge Austria’s overarching dominance in central Europe and reached near equanimity in status and power with her by 1763. The emergence of this Germanic rivalry facilitated Russia’s expansion westward and allowed her to transition from a passive European power in international politics to one that reigned hegemonic in its own spheres of influence. As geopolitical events moved eastward, Western powers declined in relative importance and influence. France was facing dire fiscal constraints in the wake of the Seven Years War and Britain was forced to adopt a policy of insulation from continental Europe to protect and concentrate their efforts on colonial markets. Indeed, this marked decline in influence evident during the partition of Poland (1772) in which the tripartite negotiations between Russia, Prussia and Austria were insulated from any real Western interference. The “Great Power” system of the later 18th century, however, was a hierarchy within itself and should certainly not be defined as a pentarchy of equal powers. It was characterised by two hegemonic flanking powers (Russia and Britain) and a relatively in-secure centre (Austria and Prussia). The concept of a “balance of power system” is best seen in an Oakeshottian light[1]. Essentially, there existed a common outer framework that consisted of certain rules and modes of conduct. It was a civil association in which states were allowed a certain amount of room for manoeuvre and to pursue their own self-interested objectives. It was thought by contemporaries at the time that in a similar working to Adam Smith’s invisible hand, the pursuit of national self-interest would promote the general security apparatus of the European continent. Arguments have been put foreword by the likes of Schroeder which suggest that very nature of this system was structurally impaired. Consequently, far from promoting peaceful co-operation among nations, the “balance of power system,” was used as a pretext for “egocentric and usually lawless expansion.” Events like the partition of Poland and the conquest of the Napoleonic Empire are viewed as “natural outcomes of 18th century rules and practices.” However, this assumption ought to be challenged. Rather than adhering to the common language of the “balance of power” system, an entirely foreign language, one with a new grammatical framework, had been introduced following the Treaty of Paris in 1763. It marked the break from, not the continuation of, 18th-century “balance of power” modes of conduct.

The Austrian War of Succession was an “indecisive series of struggles[2]” that involved all the major European states, with the exception of Russia. Although the main theatre of war was concentrated in central Europe, it also took on extra-European dimensions with conflicts taking place in India, North America and the Caribbean. It was the first war in the 18th century that started to fundamentally shift the European balance eastward and away from Britain and France. Most importantly, Prussia began to emerge as an important “first rate power.” The name of the war — Austrian War of Succession — implies that its origins lay in a dynastic dispute. Indeed, Scott had argued that the war underlined “the continuing importance of dynastic factors in international relations.” Whilst it is certainly true that dynastic claims were made on regions under the control of Maria Theresa, it should be clearly understood that the war was first triggered by Prussia’s invasion of Silesia in 1740. The latter being a territory that Prussia had no substantiated claim to. Moreover, prior to the 1740s Prussia was no “Great Power” and its invasion of Austrian land, a superior power, was seen as a major insult to the status Habsburg Monarchy. Far from being the enlightened philosopher that many on the continent viewed him to be, Frederick the Great was a cynical and determined proponent of Realpolitik and as such saw an opportunity to further the interests of the Prussian state at a time of instability in Austrian politics. The invasion of Silesia, although not dynastic in origin, still conformed to the 18th century “balance of power” system as it was predicated on limited territorial gain because Prussia had not planned to occupy any land beyond Silesia. It was limited not total in nature.

However, the move by Prussia inadvertently triggered a whole set of dynastic claims on regions under the control of Maria Theresa. The most significant being Charles Albert of Bavaria’s claims on Bohemia and Austria. In France, too, a militant group of Aristocrats under the leadership of Belle-Isle gained influence in King XV’s court and saw an opportunity to expand into its traditional enemies territory. Consequently, they attempted to build up an anti-Habsburg coalition to achieve this aim. By 1742, using Charles of Bavaria as their proxy, Bohemia and Austria were both occupied and a significant potion of its nobility defected with them. The position of Maria Theresa on the Habsburg Throne was severely threatened by these turns of events. However, the changing circumstances between 1742–1746 can be used as evidence in demonstrating how the balance of power system in Europe worked — and successfully so. The collapse of Austria would have been unfathomable to Britain as it would have given France a near hegemonic status in central Europe. Therefore, under the stern watch of the British the Austrians signed the Treaty of Breslau with Prussia and in doing so ceded Silesia to Prussia. Thereafter, although humiliated, it was able to fully concentrate on the French threat with the help of British subsidies and troops (although the 12,000 promised never actually arrived.) Moreover, following Prussia’s abandonment of the alliance it had with France, Maria Theresa was able to gain back upper Austria and Bohemia and pushed for more land with the sole aim of gaining compensation for its loss of Silesia. These actions perfectly demonstrate the inner workings of the 18th century balance of power system. Territorial gain was indeed the barometer of international success or failure but was limited in nature and the loss of one territory was normally compensated for by the gain of another.

The Treaty of Dresden and Aix-la-Chapelle in 1745 and 1748, respectively, marked the end of hostilities between the European powers at war (Austria/Prussia and Britain/France.) The military outcome was fairly indecisive and only marginal gains were made by either side. The only major loss of territory arguably being Silesia. However, the War had some fundamentally important political consequences. Firstly, it marked the inability of the French to realistically attain hegemony in central Europe. Secondly, it marked not only Austria’s military and administrative weaknesses but also set in stone a new aim: seeking revenge on Prussia for their invasion of Silesia. This enmity between the two powers would prove extremely destabilising for central Europe, especially following the westward expansion of Russia later in the century. Of course, the most significant outcome was the emergence of Prussia as a near equal power to Austria and one that still sought to assert its dominance in its surrounding regions. The geo-political axis upon which Europe had rested was slowly changing to accommodate this new dynamic.

The end of the Austrian War of Succession created a virtual stalemate between France and Britain and a growing of hostility between Austria and Prussia. It did not take long for tensions to simmer to a boiling point. After the death of the British Prime Minister Henry Pelham in 1754, that his successor — the Duke of Newcastle — took up an aggressive stance against French colonists in Northern America. To protect British interests at risk of invasion on the continent, Britain secured an alliance with Prussia. The Convention of Westminster was signed in January 1756. The agreement with Prussia outraged France as it was not only another betrayal by Prussia but it also completely isolated France from central and eastern Europe. This dilemma was harnessed by Kaunitz who persuaded the French to pivot toward its traditional enemy; Austria. The Treaty of Versailles was signed between the two powers and ensured mutual assistance and 24,000 troops if either one were attacked by Britain or Prussia. The importance of this Treaty and more generally of the “Diplomatic Revolution” cannot be understated as it changed the structure of the alliance system that had prevailed in Europe since the 17th century. Moreover, it stayed in effect for over 30 years and had significant implications on the general “balance of power system” that characterised the later 18th century. In the short term, however, Frederick of Prussia realised he was essentially hemmed in on all three sides of its borders by Austria, France and Russia, all of whom had allied together in an anti-Prussia coalition. Rather than waiting for an invasion force from one or all three of these countries, Frederick decided to act pre-emptively and invaded Saxony. In doing so another European war was started.

Similarly to the the Austrian War of Succession, the conclusion of the Seven Years War in 1763 could hardly have been said to have had a decisive military outcome. However, as Scott has highlighted, the war had decisive political consequences. Indeed, the international landscape of 1760s Europe was vastly different to that of only a decade prior. Prussia’s importance and military power was now indisputable and could no longer be challenged in this regard. It had earned itself the recognition by other states as a “Great Power.” Moreover, Russia although not as heavily involved as some of the other countries, proved to be extremely militarily strong even when faced against a Prussian army fighting on its own territory. Moreover, one major “invisible gain[3]” for Russia was the elimination of French influence in Poland. Indeed, this aided the partition of Poland later in the century which was undertaken without any mediation by France and solely dictated by eastern European powers. The war was especially disastrous for France, whose involvement has been estimated to have cost the French government around 1.3 billion livres; practically bankrupting the state. Furthermore, it highlighted in concrete terms its military inferiority both abroad and on the continent, losing to British Naval power and Prussian ground forces. Perhaps most importantly, Russia began to emerge as Europe’s fifth “Great Power,” and like Britain proved highly invulnerable to European military threats and as a result also highly hegemonic in its sphere of influence — its sphere of influence now moving progressively eastward and into regions near Prussia and Austria. A fact that was a major cause for concern for both powers.

Therefore, post-war Europe was marked by a pentarchic hierarchy of “Great Powers,” defined by a in-secure centre, whose relationship was marked by mistrust and enmity, various weak intermediary states and two dominant flanks, who appeared invulnerable and hegemonic[4]. This dynamic helped to dictate various future European events and emphasised the fact that geo-political power was now solidly concentrated in eastern Europe.

However, the settlements of 1763–65, although securing peace, failed to create a stable balance of power in Europe. In fact, Schroeder has argued that the very “balance of power” framework that contemporaries envisioned as the best way to prevent war, was actually the root cause of it. This point which has been the core focus of Schroeder’s overall thesis on 18th century international relations. Rather than viewing the events post-1763, like the partition of Poland, as a break from the 18th century states system he has argued that they were all, instead, “natural outcomes[5]” of 18th century practices. From this perspective, the term “balance” was highly subjective and its meaning varied depending on the international outlook of each of the various European states. A system that was meant to promote peace, instead, fostered a “policy of conquest[6]” and territorial acquisition in the pursuit of local, or, in the case of Napoleon, general hegemony.

The partition of Poland in 1772 can serve as evidence to demonstrate the innate “structural”

problems of the “balance of power” framework. Poland had decayed as a European power during the 17th and early 18th centuries and had been used as territorial pawn by Russia in the Seven Years War. Russia’s influence remained after the war had ceased too via the election of Stanislas Poniatowski who had been Russia’s preferred candidate of choice. Through their own minister to Poland, Prince Nikolai Repnin, Russia was able to de-facto rule Poland. These events not only evidence Russia’s emerging power in eastern Europe but also show how it was being excericsed directly in her self-interest. After the start of the Russo-Turkish war and Russia’s territorial expansion Prussia and Austria faced a critical dilemma. Both powers were at risk of being dragged into a war on opposing sides and end up fighting against each other on German territory, effectively allowing Russia to have a free reign to continue her expansion into Ottoman territory in the South and their territory in the west. According to Schroeder “balance of power” theory would suggest that the most desirable outcome would have been for Austria and Prussia, even if it was only temporary, to form an alliance against Russia. This would have enabled a significant military and political force to be mobilised against the ever encroaching Russian power. The clear failure to adopt such a strategy is viewed by Schroeder as being evidence the systems underlying defectiveness. A long-term relationship of mistrust and two differing conceptions of what “balance” constituted prevented an alliance from being formed. Prussia wanted equality with Austria and Austria wanted to remain superior to Prussia. Moreover, even if an agreement had been reached the system allowed for, even encouraged, defection from Treaty obligations; a fact Prussia was well aware of given the frequency with which it abandoned its own alliances as was the case with France in both wars. Their geographical in-security at the centre and the very rules of the framework they were operating within prevented them from combining their forces against Russia.

Following fears of a Turkish-Austro alliance, Frederick proposed the partition of Poland. Although at first Austria resented this plan it was quickly seen as a better alternative to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In return for clearly damaging Austria’s long term interests, it demanded a large compensation package and received 83,000 square kilometres of land and over 2.1 million subjects. This amounted to nearly as much land as Russia and the greatest number of inhabitants in comparison to both other parties. This partition has been seen by the likes of Scott and Ingrao as an innovation on the system of 18th century international relations. In contrast, however, Schroeder has argued that “if it was a crime, it was a commonplace one.” Three countries rather than one had peacefully divided a country between themselves and in each case gave something up in return. To Schroeder this event conformed perfectly to the prevailing “balance of power” system and set no new precedent on the conduct of international relations. The “eating away[7]” of intermediary states was encouraged by the self-interested “policy of conquest” that was imbedded in the system itself. As such the entire framework was inherently unstable as it failed to see the public good that these intermediary states in preserving the general security and functioning of the system.

However, to view the system between 1763–1814 as simply the ruthless culmination of the “balance of power” system would be a mistake. Although Schroeder marks the years between 1813–1815 as the turning point in the overall structure of international relations, no such clean break between the 18th and 19th century systems of international relations existed. A more compelling argument would be one that allows for the notion of a gradual transformation during the very period that Schroeder has analysed. In other words, the system and the motives behind the actions of the five “Great Powers” had already changed even if they were, at a surface level, still speaking the common language of the old game. Consequently, this did not mean, as Schroeder has made out, that the framework of the 18th century “balance of power” system was inherently flawed. Toward the end of the 18th century rather than becoming defective, an entirely different international relations framework was being constructed whose rules and conduct were different to that of its predecessor.

Scott has highlighted this fact in relation to the partition of Poland. Unlike Schroeder he does not view this event as being one in a line of many “partitions” that were characteristic of the 17th and 18th centuries. The division of Sweden in 1720–21 and the break up of the Spanish Empire in 1700 were fundamentally different to the partition that took place in Poland. The main reason for this is because Poland, unlike Sweden of Spain, had been a neutral country at the time of partition and had not been engaged in any war or dispute with any of the partitioning powers. Granted, territorial gain was certainly a major aspect of the Ancien Regime and was a “barometer of success[8]” on the international battlefield. Yet, most territorial gains in Sweden were both restricted by custom and by the relative indecisiveness of warfare. Both the War of Austrian Succession and the Severn Years War ended with only marginal gains for the winning side and the prospect of achieving anything realistically more than that was simply near impossible given the fiscal and administrative constraints that were needed to enable mass mobilisations and support long-term wars. Moreover, in the case of the Spanish Empire it had been triggered by dynastic issues — a major component of the international relations system in the 18th century. Even at the level of syntax, the word “partition “ is not suitable when applied to Sweden and Spain as they both maintained a significant portion of their lands.

In contrast, and in a novel set of arrangements, the partition of Poland was not predicated on its defeat in a war or because it had any series disputes with any of the “Great Powers.” Instead, it was carved up because Prussia, Russia and Austria saw it as being in their best interests to do so. It set a precedent, seen by even those at the time like Vergennes, that “established the right of the strongest in international affairs.[9]” This was in no way a “natural outcome of 18th century rules and practices.[10]” Ingrao and Scott have both highlighted potential reasons as to why such innovations in international conduct took place. One such reason found was the changing nature of land warfare.

In all wars during the 18th century prior to 1763, no real military victory was ever won. As Ingrao has pointed out, due to the inability to mobilise manpower and resources in hyper-efficient ways total war and, therefore, total victory was unlikely to occur. Consequently no one power could be hegemonic across all of Europe. To this degree, a balance of power and security for each country was always going to be maintained. Limited war and limited territorial objectives were the key characteristics of the 18th century states system.

What is evident, however, is that from 1787 onward, with the advent of the Revolutionary Wars in 1792, war tended toward a more totalising outcome. To an certain extent, this had been triggered by the resurgence of neo-absolutism which followed the end of the Seven Years War as states frantically attempted to rebuild their military’s and administrative systems in ever more efficient ways. Innovations like the “Levee en Masse” exponentially increased the numerical content of the not only of the French army but all European armies too as they strove to deal with such as numerical disadvantage. As such, wars tended to become also much larger in size too. The embodiment of total and decisive warfare was Napoleon Bonaparte. A system of marginal territorial acquisition and in-decisive warfare gave way to practically unlimited territorial expansion and total as well as decisive victories. The very fear of all 18th century European statemen — the one overarching hegemonic military power threatening the entire European states system — had been realised. It was this realisation that caused a new structure of international order in 1813–1815 to be vigorously pursued. The transformation of Europe was physically manifested via the implementation of a “system of Concert”, which Schroder has viewed as replacing the 18th century “balance of power” model.

Rather than viewing Napoleons rise as being facilitated by the old “balance of power” system it should be seen as something that existed completely outside of it. The old system contained a set of rules and modes of conduct that were suited to l territorial acquisition and a “policy of conquest” in so far as it was predicated on dynastic rights and limited, not absolute, in nature. The innovations of the late 18th century and the changing nature of warfare meant that a new mode of conduct had inadvertently been established and tacitly accepted by all major power. The old system was not inherently impaired and proved itself to be highly useful in keeping balance and stability in so far as the conditions that allowed for its maintained continued to exist. The system may therefore have been officially changed in 1813–15 but the civil association that had existed in the early to mid-18th century had been broken long before that.

[1] Schroeder: Transformation of Europe

[2] Scott: Birth of Great Power System.

[3] Scott: View from Vienna

[4] Schroeder: Transformation of Europe

[5] Schroeder: Transformation of Europe

[6] Schroeder: Transformation of Europe

[7] Scott: View from Vienna

[8] Scott: View from Vienna

[9] Scott: View from Vienna

[10] Schroeder: Response to critics