Is it most persuasive to see Hobbes’s theory of liberty as a response to republicanism?

The “greatest masterpiece of political philosophy ever written in the English language,” Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) was intellectually groundbreaking (Michael Oakeshott:”Introduction To Leviathan” in Hobbes on Civil Association,, p.23). This was especially the case in relation to his theory of liberty. To understand the “epoch-making character” of Hobbes’ theory, Leviathan needs to be seen as a purposeful intervention in the intellectual debates that permeated English political thought throughout the 1640s (Quentin Skinner: Hobbes and Republican Liberty, p.211). Indeed, Hobbes consciously states as much when he explained how he was “forced to postpone” the writing of De corpore (1655) because he “could not tolerate so many atrocious crimes being attributed to the commands of God” (Skinner: Hobbes p. 125). Unlike his earlier writings, The Elements of the Law (1640) and De Cive (1642), an entire section (chapter 21) is dedicated to the topic of liberty. Not only did Hobbes’ theory represent a clear shift in his own thought, but it also introduced an entirely new conceptual framework within which a novel interpretation of liberty was founded. Consequently, Hobbes managed to successfully challenge and break away from the conventional discourses of the republican, or neo-roman, interpretation of liberty. By re-defining liberty as the “absence of external impediments” to bodily motion, Hobbes explicitly rejected the idea that liberty was marked by the absence of arbitrary power (Hobbes: Leviathan ch. 21 p. 145). This general interpretation of Leviathan is hard to critique. However, republican liberty represented only one element of republican discourse. Therefore, we shouldn’t rush to the conclusion that Hobbes sought to repudiate republicanism altogether. Moreover, if we take Skinner’s own definition of republicanism, that being kingless government, it is arguable whether Hobbes was responding to republicanism at all.

Hobbes’ theory of liberty appears simple and un-complex. Defined at the start of chapter 21, “Liberty or freedome” is signified by the “absence of Opposition,” with opposition explicitly referring to “external Impediments” to bodily movement. As Hobbes explains in the introduction, human life is merely but a constant “motion of limbs” the sole purpose being to not come to an eternal stop (the introduction, p.9). With the concept of motion being ingrained into the readers throughout part I of Leviathan, it is easy to see how Hobbes asserted in part II that only the physical frustration of a willed action could be equated with the loss of liberty. Internal impediments to willed actions were simply not regarded as true constraints upon men’s liberty. Thus, in addressing the idea of freewill, “no liberty” could be “inferred from the will” (chap. 21, p.146). Hobbes’ universal dismissal of the effect of moral coercion on the liberty of men evidently caused great contention and was at the forefront of next wave debate later in the 17th century.

In formulating this position, Hobbes allows for fear and liberty to be “consistent” (chap. 21 p.146). Since fear is part of the “interior beginning of voluntary movement,” Hobbes is able to argue that the coercion of the will, via the arousal of fear, does not constitute an infringement upon the liberty of man (chap. 6 p.44–45). This idea is pivotal when talking about the bond of civil law. Indeed, Skinner has noted that some scholars, like J.Roland Penock and Archibald Wernham, have labelled Hobbes’ theory of liberty as inconsistent on this topic (Skinner, Visions of Politics, p. 216). They posit how Hobbes can claim that only physical bonds constrain liberty, whilst also arguing that legal bonds, that are only abstract in nature, can also hinder “what (one) has a will to ‘’ do (chap. 21 p.146)? To seek an answer we need to take a greater look at the core purpose of civil law.

Natural and civil law serve the sole purpose of keeping a covenant in place. In a state of nature covenants are able to be made but since they are formed “without the sword,” they have “no strength to secure man at all” (chap.17 p.117) In contrast, the instituted sovereign in a Commonwealth has an absolute right to the coercive apparatus of the state; civil laws have the backing of the sword. However, the presence of this “artificial” legal structure cannot be classed as an impediment to freedom. The laws themselves are nothing but weak “artificial chains” (chap. 21, p.147). Their weakness is demonstrated by Hobbes’ allusion to their “cobweb” like nature in chapter 27 (p.204). The emphasis on weakness of the legal bond is Hobbes’ way of suggesting that men have the choice as to whether they break them or not; they have the “liberty to omit” the sovereign’s law (chap.21 p.146). The laws themselves do not impose a physical constraint upon a willed action but, rather, instill a fear in men through the known consequences upon their breaking. The legal bond, therefore, acts upon the will of a man, but does not impede on the motion of a willed action.

Having analysed the core aspects of Hobbes’ theory of liberty, it is evident that the entire formulation of liberty in Leviathan was the endpoint of a long intellectual road. A seismic shift in his view occurred between the years of 1640–51. The topic of liberty is hardly discussed in either The Elements of the Law (1640) or De Cive (1642). Indeed, in the former work, Hobbes even appears to agree with Aristotle that “no man can partake in liberty but in a popular commonwealth.” (Elements of the law: Part II Chapter 8 p.170) In De Cive the idea of opposition to motion starts to emerge, but only in reference to general impediments; not solely external ones. It is only later in Leviathan that liberty occupies a large space in Hobbes’ thought and is strictly defined as referring to the absence of external impediments. It is evident why such a shift in his view occurred. The theoretical justification underpinning both the English civil war (1642–46) and the regicide of Charles I (1649) drove Hobbes to the view he eventually formulated in Leviathan. Indeed, he pins the “tumult” of the 1640s almost solely on the misrepresentation of the ancients and the propagation of ‘false doctrines.’

One of these ‘false doctrines’ centered on the discourse of republican liberty. Throughout Leviathan, Hobbes talks about liberty in the “proper signification of the word.” In using these specific words, he is taking aim at the definition that his contemporaries were prone to employing. His core contention with their definition of the word was that it somehow rendered monarchy and liberty as incompatible. The cornerstone of republican liberty was that concept of non-domination. The mere presence of arbitrary power was tantamount to an infringement on the liberty of all subjects in a commonwealth. It was heavily linked to a republican system of government since it was argued that only in a state with self-rule could non-arbitrary power be legitimately exercised. Hence, the controversial claim that republican states were the only truly “free states.” The usage of the republican idea of liberty is clearly marked in the political writings of the period; the works of, the tracts of the Levellers, the works of John Milton, and the propaganda of Nathanial Nedham serve as just some examples. Central to all their arguments was the idea that men were born with a natural liberty that was seemingly stripped away with the mere presence of a king who wielded arbitrary power. In the case of the Levellers this criticism was even extended to include parliament. In the Agreement of the People (1647) the authors warn of the danger of returning to a “slavish condition,” where the subjects of England would have been dominated not by the arbitrary power of the king, but parliament (The English Levellers, ed. A. Sharp: 1998 p.95).

However, to Hobbes, the concept of republican liberty was absurd. The presence of arbitrary power in no way constrained liberty. Whilst both Hobbes’ theory and its republican counterpart specified liberty through absence of something, Hobbes positively asserted that the absence of external impediments was the only criteria that marked the existence of liberty. Indeed, to see Hobbes’ theory of liberty as a response to the concept republican liberty would explain the movement he makes from defining liberty as absence from impediments to one of concerning only external impediments. If Hobbes had not made this move, internal impediments that acted upon the will of a man would have been legitimated as constraints on liberty. To completely render this view false he employs throughout part I of Leviathan a strictly materialist philosophy to ground his theory of liberty. Because the motion of all objects and bodies have a chain of causes attributed to them, men do not govern their bodily actions. They are determined by outside forces. As such “liberty and Necessity” are “consistent.” His theory of freedom is emphatically concerned only with willed actions, not the willing of actions.

Moving from the individual to the community, Hobbes also challenged the claim that republican government was the only means to a truly “free state.” This line of thought originated from the Florentine republican discourses of the quattrocento and was evoked frequently thereafter. Republican political theorists, like Leonardi Bruni (1370–1444) and Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527), expounded the view that only in a self-governing republican city state could subjects be totally free. Hobbes viewed this body of thought to be totally wrongheaded. He insisted that every single type of commonwealth, whether it be a monarchy or republic, was a “free-state.” He draws a parallel between the individual in the state of nature and the “artificial man” of the sovereign on the international stage. Whilst individuals can exit the state of nature by “conferring all their power and strength upon one Man, or Upon an Assembly of men,” this is an impossibility for artificial men (chap.18 p.120). There is no overarching coercive power that can lay down an international law of correct conduct. Treaties may be signed and agreements by word constructed but all states nonetheless “have absolute liberty” to pursue what they think is most conducive to their own specific ends. Thus, the state of nature not only reappears in civil war but is also a “perpetual condition” in the international arena (chap.21 p.149). Consequently, in a direct reference to his contemporaries, Hobbes states that a man in Luca has “no more Libertie, or immunities” than a man living in Constantinople (p.149). Consequently, all types of commonwealth are “free-states.”

It is hard to challenge the thesis put forward by Skinner that Hobbes’ theory of liberty was a direct riposte to the discourses of liberty being articulated by his political contemporaries. It must be analysed in its historical context; not on its own terms. In many ways, Leviathan was highly original because it was writing specifically against, rather than for, something. This is certainly true with the debate on liberty. However, whilst Hobbes did challenge the concept of republican liberty, he was not in any way repudiating the entire intellectual framework of republicanism. Hobbes saw the republican form of government as totally legitimate. In chapter 19 he states that “Sovereignty is either in one Man, or in an assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Ever every man hath right to enter or not every one” (chap.19 p.129). From this, Hobbes suggests that only three types of commonwealth can be said to exist; monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. Although it is true that he differentiates between these three kinds of commonwealth based on their “convenience or aptitude to produce peace and security of the people,” Hobbes does not write off self-government as inherently wrongheaded if it has been instituted legitimately. His main area of contention, therefore, is centered on the doctrines used to justify republicanism as a superior form of government to monarchy.

At a more profound level, the term ‘republicanism’ lies upon unstable intellectual ground. The heavily contested nature of its true definition has large ramifications for how one interprets Hobbes’ Leviathan. Depending on how one views the linguistic conventions of the discourses expounded prior to the regicide, Hobbes either engaged with republicanism or with a tradition of thought that was wholly un-republican. This is where Skinner’s own view becomes slightly problematic. His definition of republicanism, a “commitment to kingless government,” is narrow; perhaps too narrow (Blair Worden: Republicanism, Regicide and Republic 2002 p.307). Skinner himself seems to confirm this view by suggesting that the “ideals of classical republicanism suddenly acquired a new salience in the immediate aftermath of the regicide of 1649” (Skinner: Visions, Vol III, p.228). Therefore, it is hard to argue that Leviathan was a response to republicanism, unless it is in reference to works published after the regicide like Milton’s The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649). This leads us to a really important point: Republicanism is arguably a backwardly pushed idea. Historians see certain patterns and then attribute a name to these patterns. Skinner’s definition would recognise the pattern of republicanism as being marked by the absence of a king who wielded arbitrary power.

What needs to be analysed instead are the ways in which republicanism was engaged with and adapted to specific political tradition within various geographical regions. This allows for a multiplicity of unique discourses that touch upon elements of republican thought but are not a complete emulation of the constitutional republicanism that was at the heart of the italian city states in the early modern period. Let us take the English levellers as an example; a group who clearly touched upon elements of “civic republicanism.” They were writing prior to the regicide but clearly had ideas that had a republican heritage. It has already been mentioned that they adhered to a republican conception of liberty. As much is evident through their use of the term “slavish condition” as well as the idea they push that englishmen were granted freedom upon the “deliverance from slavery” (The English Levellers, ed. A. Sharp, 1998 p.98). But further to this, they highlight the need for annual election to prevent the “inconveniences arising from the long continuance of the same person in authority” (p.94). Just like in Rome, the Levellers were arguing for a rotation in office holding to prevent tyranny and corruption from taking hold in the offices of state. Despite these republican sentiments their document still allowed for the position of a king whose role would likely have been similar to the Duke of Venice. The authors state that “the power of this and all future representatives…is inferior only to those who chose them, and doth extend, without the consent or concurrence of any other person or person” (p.94). Can we call this republicanism? If we take Skinner’s definition, the mere presence of a king in the constitution, would suggest that the answer is no.

Leviathan was not a response to republicanism but to a unique form of english political discourse. The latter drew upon republican ideals but was certainly not solely republican in nature. Far from writing Leviathan as a response to republicanism, Hobbes was dealing with certain particularites of the arguments that the political theorists of the 1640s had put forward in their attempt to justify the civil war and eventual regicide. His theory of liberty dealt with one such particularity, republican liberty, but certainly not an entire body of thought.