How far and in what ways did Disraeli contribute to the transformation of the Conservative party in the second half of the 19th century?

It is evidently clear that the Conservative party underwent a significant transformation in the latter half of the 19th century. However, the idea of “transformation” is a broad term with a rich multiplicity of potential definitions. The Tory party in 1900 was structurally and socially different to the party that had existed only a few decades earlier. Therefore, the questions that require answering are: What transformations did the Party experience, what were the causes of these specific transformations, and to what degree did “Disraelian politics” influence these changes? The idea of a “Disraelian political philosophy” has been disputed by many 20th century historians. The likes of Cowling and those who share his cynical conception of politics view Disraeli as being driven solely by ambition and tactical endeavour rather than by any real fundamental philosophical or political values. Indeed, part of the art of politics is of course to understand calculation and short-term benefit, and in this sense Disraeli was no different to any other politician of his day. Whilst Disraeli was no real enthusiast of “Tory democracy,” nor of abstract political theories he did attempt throughout his life to marry his more opportunistic side with a degree of idealism. Similarly to Gladstone, he was politically moulded by the societal disintegration that had plagued the decades of ’30s and ’40s. His Conservatism was far more nuanced than simply a conviction in the defence of the English “territorial constitution.” It was a Conservatism that was characterised by an approach to politics rather than a slavish adherence to any one set of principles. It was a Conservatism that sought to transcend the differences between the various interest groups in a population by the promotion and celebration of shared ideals and traditions. He sought to create a programme that would counter the radicalism, uncertainty and growing secularism threatening English society. However, for the purposes of this essay it is largely irrelevant to concentrate upon the various sources of his political actions. As such, events like the 1867 Reform Act will not be looked at in great detail as the Act, whilst interesting in investigating the motives behind political actions, did not itself drastically change the electoral position of the party. It was in 1884 when a tectonic shift in the electoral landscape created new faultlines upon which the parties began to re-align. It is, therefore, essential to concentrate on the impact of his rhetoric and legislative agenda in order to answer the following question: “Did Disraeli bring into the Conservative party a new vision based upon a fresh set of principles?” Furthermore, transformation does not only have to be restricted to the realm of political ideals and principle. Indeed, during the late 19th century the real transformations that took place were in the party’s organisational structure and social composition.

Disraeli’s originality was restricted to his political rhetoric. It was a rhetoric that was able to take advantage of the splintering Liberal party in the 1870s and it was a rhetoric that was certainly appealing to those sections of the population who listened and absorbed it during his many speeches. But the “Tory Democracy” that many later Conservatives associated with Disraeli was never at the forefront of his agenda whilst he was in office between 1874–1880. Furthermore, there was no transformation in Conservative party policy or ideology during these years. It was a government that was led by deeply Conservative instincts. The Conservative party was gaining greater respectability and support not because it offered something new but because it represented something that was old. In other words, they embodied a style politics that was not Liberal nor radical. It no longer had to present itself as the alternative party that championed modernity as it had done in 1859 and 1867. Instead, it could stand on an unashamedly traditional Conservative platform that emphasized stability and order rather than novelty and legislative innovation. As one Tory MP notes, “I had expected his mind to be full of legislative schemes…this did not prove to be the case.” There was, indeed, a tension between Disraeli’s rhetoric and political reality. However, Disraeli’s government wasn’t completely devoid of any legislative impetus. The social policy of the ministry showed a degree of open-mindedness despite its Conservative credentials. In relation to labour legislation, his ministry was able to pass the Employers and Workmen Act which decriminalised most breaches of industrial contract and managed to repeal the unpopular 1871 Criminal Amendment Act, substituting it with the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act which legalised the practice of peaceful picketing. On agriculture his ministry was able to pass the Agricultural Holding Bill of 1875 which promised farmers the security of compensation along the same lines which Gladstone had granted to Irish farmers five years prior. Perhaps most controversially he passed the 1876 Education Act which introduced the element of compulsory attendance into educational provision. However, apart from perhaps the mandatory education aspect of the latter Bill, the social policy followed by Disraeli was neither partisan, nor particularly political. It was based on pragmatism and electoral consideration rather than on Conservative principles. By 1880 the impetus for new legislation had been completely exhausted and there was a move to concentrate on foreign rather than domestic issues. The Palmerstonian message of order, stability and safety at home as well as abroad was essentially the manifesto of Disraeli’s Conservative party.

The importance of Palmerstone’s legacy is critical in understanding the Conservative party’s position in this period. Gladstone had automatically inherited the “Palermstonian alliance” by nature of his accession to the Liberal leadership. The 1867 Reform Act was used by Disraeli not as a means to further democracatic principles but more so as an instrument to dismantle this coalition of interests in the attempt to subsume elements of it into a more broad-based Conservative alliance. Although he was unable to capitalise on it immediately Disreali was able to benefit from the internal strife it caused within the Liberal party only a few years later. In this sense Disraeli played an important part in the temporary disintegration of the Liberal party in the early 1870s. In Disraeli’s own words in 1865 the Tory party’s job “now that the Lion (Palmerston) was dead” was to “persuade the public that we (were) the right party to roll ourselves up in the lion’s skin.” He was explicitly stating that the Tory party’s future did not lie in the adoption of a new political philosophy nor in a new style of politics but rather in the amalgamation of the various pieces of the soon to be shattered Liberal coalition. Disraeli’s own actions furthered this cause. His disdain for consensus style politics, much like Gladstone, and his favouring of political conviction helped demarcate far more clearly than in the past the core differences between the two parties. His skilful manipulation of the Reform Bill and the breaking of precedent at the Queen’s Speech in 1868 helped to formulate the clear boundaries of the Conservative party in the House whilst simultaneously forcing Gladstone to shed any real remnants of his Conservative credentials and appear beholden to the radical and “left” wing section of the Liberal party. Whether the increase in support for the Conservative party after 1868 was due to Gladstone’s radical affiliations or the populist Conservative rhetoric articulated by Disraeli is hard to accurately ascertain. However, the ability to present the Tory party as a clearly distinct political body within parliament certainly would have helped those who were potentially ambivalent about voting for the Tories at subsequent elections. Especially after Derby’s departure in 1878, these tactics allowed the Conservative party to dispense with its more liberal section and form a more overtly illiberal and right wing identity.

Therefore, the passage of the Reform Bill, rhetoric aside, was not predicated on the advancement of “Tory democracy.” Many Tories by 1874 were still acutely worried about potential implications of 1867 and were still fearful about the potentially subversive nature of the “working man’s” political attitude. Disraeli was trapped within the old conventions of politics. He emphasised his Conservatism in manor that was vulgar to even staunch Tories. Perhaps this was due to his status as an Jewish outsider trying to integrate into the deeply aristocratic Conservative establishment. The times that he did emerge from this ideological prison, such as his approach to party organization pre-1874, he quickly returned to it once it had delivered him elected office. The unexpected borough victories were not consolidated via political patronage. Instead, the established interests of the Tory party were rewarded and key electoral battlegrounds, to the despair of Tory borough leaders and party agents like Gorst, were neglected. The fragile edifice of a new organisational system that had been painstakingly constructed after the 1868 election was left to decay once power had been attained in 1874. The situation reflected a dangerous dichotomy facing the party. The interests of the counties and landed class still exerted an unparalleled influence over the party whilst they were simultaneously seeing a waning in their electoral power with the onset of political reform. Party men like Gorst realised the crucial necessity to balance the interests of the gentry with those of the boroughs and the newly enfranchised working classes. The lack of effort from Disraeli and the high leadership of the central Tory party to remedy this glaring issue caused Gorst to resign and launch an attack from “without” against those “within.” It is evident that by 1890 the organisational structure of the Conservative party had undergone a significant transformation. But this change was not driven by Disraeli nor the inner sections of the Conservative party. The change originated at the grassroots with Tory local leaders. The design that was constructed was a tiered system. Provincial unions would act as the middle men between the smaller local party associations and the larger National Union. In this way the localities, dealing with specifically local organisation, electioneering and party propaganda, were attached to a central body which could then report upward to the Conservative party leadership. Crucially, however, in contrast to the National Liberation union, the National Conservative Union was not a source of policy initiatives. It was solely concerned with organisation. In line with traditional Tory principles, a two way deal essentially existed. The localities and their organisational campaigns would be left free from central party harassment but the central party would also be free from the demands of localities when making policies and deciding particular courses of political action. This system of party organisation was intricately linked with urban conservatism and its importance was magnified by the Reform Act of 1884 and its accompanying provision on seat redistribution. This Act and its subsequent impact upon the British political landscape nothing other than truly monumental. The elections between 1868–1880 witnessed a clear shift in opinion toward the Conservative party; evidenced by the increase in the share of their vote from 37.5% in 1868 to 44.3% in 1880. However, they only gained an extra two seats in this time period. The Redistribution of Seats Act 1885 essentially detached large swathes of Conservative voters who had previously been the minority in large constituencies and placed them on “Islands of their own.” These “one class constituencies,” as Goschen labelled them, were naturally going to look inward, toward their own interests, and not outward, toward those of the wider community. The implications of the Act transcended party considerations. It in fact changed the very nature of politics itself. It was at this point that the British polity began to operate in a much more recognisably modern way. The attempt by politicians, such as Gladstone, to achieve coalitions that were vertical in nature became extremely difficult to sustain because the Act, through the creation of many single interest constituencies, actively encouraged a more overtly class based politics. The transformation of Conservatism was, therefore, aided by the rapidly changing techniques of organisation coupled with the impactful Redistribution of Seats Act which recognised the primacy of the city and industrial heartlands. Moreover, it truly initiated the electoral decline of the landed interests in the counties. This was not the consequence of actions taken by those located within the higher echelons of party management, like Disraeli. Instead, it arose from “without” and was promoted and manned by a new body of urban supporters. However, the fact that the cities and industrial areas were given greater political representation did not determine the direction they would vote at elections. It should not be assumed that either middle class or working class voters would only vote conservative, especially in the case of the former. But many predominantly working class boroughs consistently returned Conservative candidates throughout the last quarter of the 19th century. The question, therefore, that requires answering is this: “What changes occurred in the social composition of Conservative party between 1868–1900 and why did these changes take place?

The core of the party’s support in the years after 1868 was the propertied and Anglican middle classes. The militant Non-Conformist groups supporting Gladstone and his policies, particularly the Endowed School Act of 1870, caused great unease among middle class men of rank and status in society. The hemorrhage of middle class support can be evidenced by the poor performance of the Liberals in the 1874 election, losing numerous seats in the southern shires and in London; both middle class strongholds. The Conservative party became the natural home of the middle classes, a fact that remained true well into the 1980s. However, the Liberals also lost a substantial section of working class support. The latter being a group which the Liberals had successfully represented prior to 1874. However, by 1900 a distinctly urban and working class Conservatism had been cultivated and as such it would be incorrect to automatically assume that simply because the Liberals pandered to their interests that the working classes voted for them. As Lawrence correctly emphasises, political belief does not simply stem from the “objective” economic and social interests of different electoral groups. To think in such a way would be to impose a rigid and static identity onto groups whose individual self-perceived political interests were heterogeneous and fluid. The working classes were not a monolithic voting bloc but were, instead, composed of various different social constituencies whose shape and structure could be moulded by party for electoral benefit. The emergence of a working class Conservatism is easier to envisage. It was a Toryism that was plebian in nature and one that operated at the local, rather than national, level. The local leaders naturally came from a vastly different social context to the landed “backbone” of the central Tory party. A conventional view is that it was the Disraelian rhetoric of “Tory Democracy” and patriotism that drew the working classes into the Conservative fold. There is certainly an element of truth to this. It was the most patriotic section of the population and was evidently responsive to speech’s Disraeli made in the early 1870s. The most famous being the speech he gave to working class men and women at the Free Trade Hall in Manchester in 1872. However, I think that Disraeli’s rhetoric was moving with the grain of political change. The Tories in the 1870s were benefiting from, and capitalising upon, the temporary collapse of Liberal party support. This included an exodus of middle and working class Liberal voters. The perceived capture of the Liberal party by religious “faddists,” the loss of its libertarian traditions and the coercive nature of its zealous “moral reform” programme were all examples of a State overstepping its natural boundaries. Perhaps slightly ironic given Gladstone’s fervent belief in its minimalistic conception. The old Liberal Party that was once a coherent broad-coalition of various interests with a tolerant outlook was succumbing to intellectual rigidity and sectarian politics. The Conservative’s did not need to do much to attract the support that was already leaving the Liberal party. Disraeli was able to appeal to disenchanted voters by elevating country and national well being above party and material interests. Moreover, the changing organisational structure of the Conservative party was placing great emphasis on the autonomy of the localities and the cultivation of civic identity. The working class man wanted a sense of respectability, something the “moral reforms” of the Liberals, with legislation like the 1872 Liscening Act, were not providing. Consequently, the Tories were able to tap into this insecurity by presenting themselves as the natural party of the working man and as a party which facilitated the quiet pursuit of an independent life for those who wanted it. This transformation in the party, however, was relatively short-lived. The collapse of the “local idyll” coincided with the fall of Gladstone’s “Non-Conformist State.” By 1906 the appeal of New Liberalism and its emphasis on social rather than moral reform began to re-capture large sections of the working classes.

Although Disraeli’s government made tentative approaches to social reform in the 1870s his premiership ultimately was an expression of traditional Toryism and a display of narrow partisanship. There was no new vision, no new intellectually exciting programme offered by Disraeli. The core principles of conservatism underwent no significant reshaping. But the party itself did. Its organisation became more efficient and co-ordinated and its social composition diffused outward to larger sections of the British society. These transformations, whilst aided at times by Disraelian rhetoric, were never propelled forward by Disraelian ideas. The changes were by-products of circumstance, not purposeful Tory policy.