For many on the British Right today Marxism represents a doctrine that is anathema to the Conservative disposition. Indeed, it is easy to see why the idea of Tory Marxism is a juxtaposition of the greatest kind. To most, marxism is radically egalitarian, whilst Toryism has always found it necessary to defend inequality in one form or another. One triumphs conservation, the other radical change. However, British Conservative thought is lacking a certain intellectual flair that in the past had been subtly present. The Conservative Party of today does not really deserve the title it gives itself. It is not Conservative in any true intellectual sense of the word and its actions since 1979, and especially so since 2016, serve as evidence for this. Its inhabitants are educated but closed minded. There appears to be an inability to appeal to the thought and ideas of thinkers and academics who occupy positions outside of the traditional Conservative canon. However, this has not always been the case as Charles Troup recently stated in a think piece for the Journal of Intellectual History. The 1970s and 1980s saw a clear assimilation of Marxist thinking and analysis into British Conservative thought most explicitly stated by the likes of Roger Scruton and Maurice Cowling; both of whom were members of the “Salisbury Group.” They were writing at time just prior to Mrs. Thatcher’s assumption of office and were skeptical of the Hayekian Liberalism that was deeply ingrained into both her campaign and the influential think tanks that surrounded the Tory party at the time (I.E.A.) To propose an alternative pathway for British Conservative thought they drew upon a wide array of thinkers — one of whom was Marx. Although some of the ideas expressed by this group of academics were clearly of their time, the intellectual breadth and penetrating thought allowed them to articulate the British Conservative creed in a powerful, yet subtle, way. One which I think has yet to be properly matched. I wish to now turn to Cowling’s essay “The Present Position” (1978 Conservative Essays) and explain the Cowlingite conception of Toryism as well as provide a number of my own thoughts that relate to the questions he posed and, the answers he gave, in relation to the future direction of the Conservative party under Thatcher and her successors.
Cowling took immense delight in exposing the flaws of “high liberalism.” It would only be natural for him to warm to the destructive capabilities of Marxist thought. Of course, Marxian mono-causal explanations of complex topics like history are woefully inaccurate and Marx’s own predictions of future political arrangements were simply never borne out. However, Marx the prophet is very different to Marx the intellectual. Unlike Whig-Liberals who masked over the true forces that operated within British political history, Marx was a cynic and evidently clear-eyed about the role that power and conflict played in determining political outcomes. A quick read (if that is possible) of Cowling’s “1967: Reform Act” shows the influence of such Marxist ideas. The second Reform Act was not an inevitable stop on the long road toward British democracy but an event that occurred due to high political maneuvering of politicians motivated by the driving forces of politics: power and authority. To deny this would be to commit a gross act of self-deception. Self-deception, more generally, is rife within wider society. Many people, especially Conservatives, like to downplay the antagonisms that exist within it — sometimes even claiming that they don’t exist at all. The idea of a “class struggle” is a “real historical fact” that does not deserve to be ignored nor downplayed. It is how one deals with that accords immense thought. In his essay Cowling states, “If there is a class war — and there is — it is important that it should be handled with subtlety and skill.” Therefore, one way that it will never be handled with “subtlety and skill” is when those in power are so myopic or self-deceiving as not to even see that it evidently exists. It is here where Marxist and Conservative thought have an intellectual affinity that is not shared with Liberalism. They both recognise the central battleground of politics as being located where conflict concerns authority — whether t-hat be in a given institution, office or general political arrangement. Marxism and Conservatism both speak the language of power — the only “true political commodity which has the ability to change hands.” Everything else is merely an instrument that is used in the pursuit of ascending “the greasy pole” toward the upper echelons of political power.
However, throughout the course of the 20th century social and economic Liberalism managed to diffuse itself into the Tory party, albeit at different times. The post-war Liberal-Conservatism of Butler and Macmillan gave way to the Hayekian liberal-Conservatism of Joseph and Thatcher in the 1970s. Whilst they were naturally different strands of the Liberal creed they both obscured and distorted the true Conservative political position. Both the economic liberalism of Hayek and the pluralistic liberalism of Berlin hailed freedom, specifically the negative conception of freedom, as the ultimate value. Indeed, for Hayek once negative freedom had been achieved the highest stage of civilisation was said to have been reached. There was no need for any further progression to a higher state of living. Once society had reached the attainment and sustenance of this sacred ideal his aversion to constructivist rationalism was suddenly forgotten and his Conservatism sprung into action to defend the societal conditions that allowed freedom to flourish. This was the central tension in his thought, and quite a major tension too given its implications for his entire intellectual framework. However, the idea that freedom is society’s ultimate value is manifestly flawed. Freedom itself is an abstract conception that is difficult to succinctly articulate. To the electorate, it is subconsciously defined in its negative sense — to be free from constraints imposed by the will of others. In other words, is there more or less interference in the private lives of citizens? It revolves around a public and private division which sees the encroachment of the latter by the former as a violation of an individual’s “natural liberty” and “freedoms.” However, to a Conservative freedom does not mean this at all even if they say it means this. To a Conservative freedom is not a soundbite or ultimate ideal but an rhetorical instrument which hides the true objectives and values of Toryism. To a degree it is a form of doublespeak — meaning one thing explicitly but another thing implicitly. The Conservative conception of freedom is one that “allows the maintenance of existing inequalities or the restoration of lost ones.” Clearly, most of those who benefit from society’s material wealth, from political power, from its education opportunities want these inequalities and the system that delivers them conserved. Yet, simultaneously many of those who receive little of these benefits recognise that such inequalities exist and assume, in a weird sense, that they ought to exist. This is contrary to most people’s thinking and begs the question as to why this is? Why would people who have no real benefit from the inequalities in a specific society seek their maintenance? Part of the reason is that societies are stratified entities and as such afford privileges to certain sections of the population. Inequality is endemic to the “social structure.” There is a pragmatic adherence to this reality and as such, no ideological proclamation is required to defend it.This has been the case in every single society that has ever existed throughout human history. It is a simple and irrefutable fact. To view the “social structure” in terms of inequality is to adopt a socialist analysis. Many Conservatives again at this point would refrain from choosing to look down the same analytical lens in order to avoid any discussion that entails a recognition of endemic inequality. This is a mistake as it depicts Conservatives as people who are denying the existence of something that is so clearly present. A “Tory Marxism” is needed to challenge the Marxist critique of the “social structure” and its inequalities. The Conservative vision of society, like the Marxist vision, absolutely recognises the existence of inequality, however, it refuses to justify it. There is no need to because the inevitability of inequalities makes their justification un-necessary.
To not justify a principle is not to say that a discussion of inequality should not take place. Indeed, it is the primary function of politics to determine the appropriate degree of inequality through the use of taxation and State run redistributive networks. However, inequalities are not determined by discussion or deliberation but rather by the “balance of operative power.” The Conservative classes are naturally those who acquire the benefits from the system and, thus, are Conservative because their self-interest coincides with their judgement that existing political arrangements should be conserved. Those who benefit from the “social structure,” therefore, do not wish to see this country’s parliamentary democracy superseded by another form of government. For those who still cling to the wish of reducing inequalities to zero or near zero an anti-democratic approach is required to overturn the system. This poses significant problems for those who wish to change the “social structure” and its inherent inequalities but are unwilling to commit themselves to overturning British parliamentary democracy. Cowling’s “Conservative Essays” were written with the hope that “parliamentary arrangements should be retained, that most of what is needed can be secured by rhetoric rather than force and that the function of the Conservative party in these circumstances is two fold — to press the existing elite and its (subsequent) replacements to think and act in a conservative manner, and to give public expression on their behalf to opinions that will help create a public sentiment of national solidarity with them.” In other words, deep thinking is needed about what is necessary to persuade citizens that they belong to “a city that is worth belonging to.” To succeed in answering this question the answer lies beyond the pursuit of policy X or policy Y. It lies beyond the promise of future GDP growth and increasing material wealth. These are all transitory whims — able to be easily promised but impossible to guarantee. For Cowling the most important determination of political solidarity and opinion was the creative activity of the intelligentsia. The public doctrine of a society is determined by the prevailing opinion of the intelligentsia at a given time. Historian Boyd Hilton has articulated the process through which this occurs in his explanation of the doctrine of the “Primacy of politics.” The only way that private individuals in a society interact with each other is through public forums. By disseminating information through these various public mediums it follows that if one political grouping with its own particular ideas and rhetoric triumphs over their rivals, this may have a profound effect on how all citizens subsequently act and behave. In the 35 years prior to Cowling’s essay the Left were on the ascendency and not only drove traditional Conservatism into moral and intellectual disrepute but also dictated the terms of the post-war settlement as well as the future direction of both the Labour and Conservative party (in both cases in a liberal or leftward direction.) The power that such prevailing intellectual sentiment can wield is evidently huge. The 1970s marked a watershed moment — the public doctrine of the left was on the retreat and a space in the intellectual market appeared within which a new public doctrine could be articulated and propagated to wider British society. It was with this aim that these essays were written. Essentially, Cowling was seeking an answer to the question: What should be said that will make citizens feel that they are citizens of no mean city?
What Cowling was trying to do in 1978 was propose a way forward for the Conservative party that rejected the Liberal-Conservatism of the 1950s and the class resentments of the 1970s. However, it was not an endorsement of Thatcher per se. Cowling’s tone suggested a suspicion of the newly emerging neo-liberal movement and its rhetoric of free markets and globalisation. It would not manufacture the spiritual glue that was needed to bind down the elite and the wider British public. Forty-Two years have now passed since 1978 and Thatcher has been comfortably assigned to the history books. It is safe to make the assertion that Thatcher made economic liberalism the cornerstone of her political project. During her time in office the economic essentially became the political. The influence of Hayek, of Friedman, of the Adam Smith Institute and the I.E.A proved to be far stronger than the traditional Toryism of the likes of Powell. The market was unshackled, the frontiers of the State rolled back, the city was deregulated, the public sector privatised and society became increasingly individualistic and atomised. As Cowling foresaw, the public doctrine of the country was significantly altered but into a form that he would have disliked. The doctrine of Neo-Liberalism triumphed over its rivals and became hegemonic. It helped to forge a new rightward trajectory for both parties. “New Labour” abolished clause 4 and capitulated to the core tenants of the Neo-Liberal consensus. Still today, a significant number of Tory MPs remain wedded to Thatcherism as a political creed. The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the circulation of books pointing to the “End of History” appeared to confirm Hayek’s core thesis. Free-market democracy could not be trumped — no higher stage of societal development would be reached.
The market, however, cannot offer people an otherworldly attachment or a feeling of national solidarity. It is an impersonal abstraction that is an instrument used in the pursuit of material goods. The doctrines of self-help and individualism don’t accommodate the social side of man. People want to belong to something greater than themselves — to their wider community and nation. Far from providing this, the Conservative’s evangelical adherence to the market helped to destroy numerous national industries, albeit failing ones, and subsequent fiscal rectitude caused the communities that surrounded them to decay and rot. No ideas as to how they were to be rebuilt and refashioned were ever provided. The advice given to those who complained: “get on your bike.” The 2008 Crash proved the financial instability that underlay the entire project and the austerity started in 2010 helped to tear open an even greater gap between the “haves” and “have nots.”. The “Great Society,” envisioned by Cameron was never to be attained during his premiership. The decade between 2010 and 2020 has seen the decay and collapse of the Neo-liberal consensus and, just like the Left in 1978, is on the retreat. What this means is that there will be, if it doesn’t exist already, an opening in the intellectual market. A new public doctrine is yet to be firmly established and disseminated to the wider public. The occurrence of Brexit points in the direction of a rather vulgar Conservatism that could be emerging. However, Brexit was an isolated event caused by high political instability within the Tory party that somehow managed to escape the walls of parliament and into the mind of the British public, most of whom were until then not worried about it as an significant electoral issue. Brexit has no doubt exacerbated existing tensions within the country but it is unlikely that it was caused by them (see earlier article: High Politics of Brexit). Brexit was just one expression of the conflict between the metropolitan, educated, younger, socially liberal half of the country and the provincial, less-educated, more socially conservative, older half. The rise of Corbyn being another expression of these same exact tensions, albeit with slightly different alignments. Yet, the class based rhetoric and its accompanying programme of democratic socialism looked back to the precedent set in the 1970s rather than to the possibilities of the future. Both Brexit and Corbyn were nostalgic political projects that were unlikely to ever achieve what they promised on the campaign trail. Brexit certainly did not contain the “fallen” tone which Cowling would expect from Conservative statesmen. Brexit will not reduce the regional inequalities that exist in Britain nor will it invoke a renewed sense of national solidarity given the way in which the entire vote was conducted. Projects based on identity politics never last particularly long in the world of politics. Once this is fully realised, which I think is slowly happening on the Conservative benches, another political path will need to be sought after. The Neo-Liberal consensus is collapsing and a new public doctrine is needed to replace it. Therefore, the question is this: In what form and with what ideas should this new public doctrine take?
